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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Trinity 
Lutheran, and Trumpism: Codifying Fiction with 
Administrative Gaslighting 
Robin Knauer Maril1 
INTRODUCTION 
For over a century, courts have weighed state actions that balance the restraints of 
the Establishment Clause with the obligations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Establishment Clause prohibits the making of a 
law respecting the establishment of any religion, while the Free Exercise Clause provides 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”2 The space 
between these two strongholds of our democracy has been described by the United States 
Supreme Court as the “play within the joints.”3 As the Supreme Court explained in Locke 
v. Davey,4 there are state actions that are “permitted by the Establishment Clause, but not 
required by the Free Exercise Clause.”5 A number of recent high profile cases before the 
Court have sought to further define the contours of this space, and determine the limitations 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). These cases, however, have provided 
little clarity for the government with respect to its implementation of federal policies and 
programs.6 Despite the absence of clear guidance from the Court, the Trump administration 
has consistently pointed to Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer and 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. as mandates to protect and enable religious-based 
discrimination by federal grantees and contractors delivering federal services.7 In doing so, 
 
1 Visiting Assistant Professor, Willamette University College of Law. I would like to thank Sherwet 
Witherington for her thoughtful edits and contributions. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
3 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
4 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  
5 Id. at 719. 
6 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
7 See, e.g., Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause's Religious 
Exemption, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,677 (proposed on Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60) (adopting 
a regulation designed to strip workers of basic protections and empowering businesses and organizations 
receiving taxpayer dollars to discriminate against their employees with few safeguards from abuse); Health 
and Human Services Grants Regulation, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,831 (proposed on Nov. 19, 2019) (to be codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 75) (proposing revisions to the federal Uniform Administrative Requirements for grant 
programs that strip explicit nondiscrimination provisions from the existing text); Equal Participation of 
Faith-Based Organizations in the Department of Labor's Programs and Activities: Implementation of 
Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2,937 (proposed Jan. 17, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2) 
(allowing providers operating a voucher program to require a beneficiary to engage in religious activities); 
Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 27,846 (proposed 
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the administration has dismissed the consensus of legal scholars and commentators 
regarding the limitations of these opinions.  
Throughout Trump’s first term in office, his administration has misapplied and 
misrepresented recent Supreme Court decisions and statutes to sanction the adoption of 
expansive religious exemptions for organizations receiving federal funding. Proponents of 
this routinized repeal of civil rights protections argue that the Trump administration is 
merely restoring the correct balance of religious liberties in the federal government.8 
However, the regulations and policies included in this campaign unconstitutionally 
broaden the already robust religious protections provided by statutes and the Court and 
have the effect of dismantling the civil rights infrastructure of the past fifty years. These 
actions reach beyond the expansive Bush-era faith-based regulations by removing 
beneficiary protection and prioritizing organizational and church access to taxpayer-funded 
grants.9  
This Article addresses the Trump administration’s consistent misinterpretation and 
misapplication of legal precedent to support unnecessary religious exemptions that exceed 
constitutional mandates and impair the rights of third parties to access federal services and 
programs. This Article specifically focuses on the Trump administration’s application of 
RFRA,10 Trinity Lutheran,11 and Hobby Lobby12 as egregious examples of the 
administration’s efforts to gaslight the American public in order to elevate the rights of 
large religious organizations. Part I provides an overview of Trinity Lutheran13 and the 
traditional understanding of the appropriate intersection of federal funding and free 
exercise. Part I also demonstrates how disparate Trump agencies use Trinity Lutheran as a 
mandate to dismantle civil rights protections and promote religious-based discrimination 
with federal funding. Part II discusses RFRA in the context of enforcement of general 
nondiscrimination and civil rights laws, Hobby Lobby,14 and the rights that RFRA affords 
organizations doing business with the federal government. Part II also discusses the Trump 
administration’s abuse of RFRA to sanction sweeping, unsupported government reforms 
 
June 14, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 438, 440, 460 and 45 C.F.R. pts. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156) 
(eliminating the explicit inclusion of discrimination on the basis of “gender identity” within the regulation’s 
sex nondiscrimination protections); Department of Housing and Urban Development, Revised 
Requirements Under Community Planning and Development Housing Programs (Spring 2019), 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201904&RIN=2506-AC53 (allowing 
shelters receiving taxpayer dollars to turn transgender people away entirely or provide unsafe housing); 
Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General Sessions Issues Guidance 
on Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, (Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with Department of Justice), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-issues-guidance-federal-law-protections-
religious-liberty (implementing a sweeping directive to federal agencies regarding religious exemptions in 
part utilizing an overly broad interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).  
8 Pete Madden, Jeff Sessions Consulted Christian Right Legal Group on Religious Freedom Memo, ABC 
NEWS, (October 6, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/jeff-sessions-consulted-christian-legal-
group-religious-freedom/story?id=50336322. 
9 See generally, The Quiet Revolution: The President’s Faith Based and Community Initiative: A Seven 
Year Progress Report, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2008), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/government/fbci/The-Quiet-Revolution.pdf. 
10 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb4 (1993). 
11 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
12 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
13 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
14 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
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and regulations. Finally, in Part III, this Article concludes that given the faulty legal support 
of these cases, the regulations implemented under them fail to meet the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedures Act and are therefore legally specious. Courts should thus 
vacate these legally specious regulations when the regulations are challenged. 
I. TRINITY LUTHERAN V. COMER: EQUAL ACCESS TO TIRE SCRAPS, NOT A CARTE 
BLANCHE TO DISCRIMINATE. 
A. Playground Resurfacing and Free Exercise: States on Notice 
In 2012, a preschool and childcare center operated by Trinity Lutheran Church in 
Columbia, Missouri, applied to receive a state grant to update its playground surface.15 The 
Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offered grants to schools that 
reimbursed the cost of purchasing playground surfaces made from recycled tires.16 These 
awards were made on a competitive basis.17 The state enforced a “strict and express policy 
of denying grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious 
entity,” citing the Establishment Clause of the state Constitution.18 As a result of this 
policy, Trinity Lutheran was determined ineligible and denied the grant.19 The state 
declined to provide the grant to the church, citing concerns of violating the Establishment 
Clause of the state Constitution.20 Trinity Lutheran challenged the DNR’s denial, alleging 
violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech 
Clauses of the First Amendment.21 The District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
granted DNR’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that excluding a 
religious institute from the grant program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.22 The 
court further found no evidence in Supreme Court precedent that suggested that the 
decision not to award a grant evinced hostility toward religion in violation of the neutrality 
toward religion mandated by the Establishment Clause.23 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision.24 
In its 2017 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s judgment, 
finding that Missouri had violated the church’s Free Exercise rights by refusing to provide 
the grant solely because of the school’s religious status.25 The majority decision, drafted 
by Chief Justice Roberts, was joined by Justices Kennedy, Alito, Kagan, Thomas, and 
Gorsuch.26 Justices Gorsuch and Thomas authored concurring opinions.27 Justice 
 
15 Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2017. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (D. Mo. 2013). 
22 Id. at 1155, 1157. 
23 Id. at 1155. 
24 Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d at 790. 
25 Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2025. 
26 Id. at 2016. 
27 Id.  
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Sotomayor authored the dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg.28 The majority opinion relied 
heavily on the distinction between religious status and conduct to determine that “denying 
a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on 
the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state interest ‘of the highest 
order.’”29  
The Trinity Lutheran Court relied heavily on McDaniel v. Paty30 to further define 
state action burdening free exercise.31 McDaniel struck down a Tennessee law that 
disqualified ministers from serving as delegates to the State’s constitutional convention.32 
The McDaniel Court found that requiring the complainant to step down from his status as 
a minister to be a delegate was a choice that unduly burdened his free exercise of religion.33 
In applying McDaniel to the state’s decision in Trinity Lutheran, the Court held that like 
the restrictive statute at question in McDaniel, “the Department’s policy puts Trinity 
Lutheran to a choice: It may participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain 
a religious institution.”34 In quoting McDaniel, the Court held that “[t]o condition the 
availability of benefits . . . upon [a recipient’s] willingness to . . . surrender[] his religiously 
impelled [status] effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional liberties.”35 
Here, the Court added the word “status” in brackets, which did not appear in the original 
text of the McDaniel decision.36 This addition makes clear that the majority opinion solely 
focused on how state actions unduly burden free exercise based on an individual or entity’s 
religious “status” as opposed to activities or conduct in which they engage. 
The Court then distinguished the actions taken by Missouri in Trinity Lutheran from 
those of Washington state in Locke.37 In Locke, a prospective seminary student challenged 
the state’s restriction of scholarship funding toward his divinity degree.38 The Washington 
state scholarship program provided high performing students with financial scholarships 
that could be used at religious and non-religious schools.39 However, students were not 
allowed to use the scholarship towards a devotional theology degree—one “devotional in 
nature or designed to induce religious faith.”40 In this case, the Supreme Court found that 
this limitation did not unduly burden the student’s free exercise of religion.41 The Trinity 
Lutheran Court distinguished the two cases by stating,  
Washington’s restriction on the use of its scholarship funds was different. 
According to the [Locke] Court, the State had ‘merely chosen not to fund a 
distinct category of instruction.’ Davey was not denied a scholarship 
because of who he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he 
 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 2019. 
30 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
31 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2019. 
32 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621. 
33 Id. at 629. 
34 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2021. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 2022. 
37 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
38 Id. at 718. 
39 Id. at 716. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 725. 
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proposed to do -- use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no 
question that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it 
is -- a church.42 
The Court further concluded that the religious conduct that the claimant in Locke sought to 
pursue with state funds must be distinguished from this case.43 The Court stated that 
“Washington’s restriction on the use of its funds was in keeping with the State’s 
antiestablishment interest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training of clergy, an 
‘essentially religious endeavor,’” and held that “nothing of the sort can be said about a 
program to use recycled tires to resurface a playground.”44 This conclusion indicates that 
in cases involving programs that do involve “essentially religious endeavors”—including 
religious programming and ministry in the context of federal program service delivery—
the Locke standard should apply. 
B. The Federal Government’s Administrative Misapplication of Trinity Lutheran 
In the three years following the Trinity Lutheran decision, the Trump administration 
has routinely cited the Court’s reprimand of the State of Missouri as cover for government-
wide revisions to civil rights regulations and policies.45 For example, the Department of 
Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) issued a directive in 
August 2018 and a proposed regulation in June 2019, revising the Office’s rules binding 
federal contractors, in which it cited directly to the case.46 OFCCP conducts audits, 
investigates complaints of employment discrimination, and reviews hiring data to ensure 
compliance with Executive Order 11246.47 Since 1965, Executive Order 11246 has 
provided meaningful protections for employees of federal contractors and subcontractors 
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin.48 Over the past five 
decades, protections have been added to include discrimination because of sex, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity.49 These protections provide security to workers and equip 
them with meaningful administrative recourse.50 Importantly, it also provides contractors 
with a clear set of expectations and standards regarding their treatment of employees.51  
 
42 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2023. 
43 Id. at 2024. 
44 Id. at 2023. 
45 Id. at 2024 (including the narrowing language as Footnote 3 to the Court’s finding that the Missouri rule 
amounts to “churches need not apply”). 
46 Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption, 84 
Fed. Reg. 41,677 and, 41,680-81 (proposed on Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“This 
approach, which recognizes contractors’ exercise of religion, is also consistent with Supreme Court 
decisions emphasizing that “condition[ing] the availability of benefits upon a recipient’s willingness to 
surrender his religiously impelled status effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional 
liberties.” (citing Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2022 (alterations omitted) (quoting McDaniel, 
435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion)). 
47 Locke, 540 U.S. at 716. 
48 Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
49 Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2014). 
50 Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 at § 209 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
51 Id. at § 202 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
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The proposed 2019 regulation (2019 Proposed Regulation) incorporated expansive 
religious exemptions from compliance with these nondiscrimination provisions.52 As 
proposed, this regulation would empower a for-profit federal contractor to present religious 
belief as a defense to a claim or finding of employment discrimination.53 This exemption 
would be available to any contractor that holds itself out to the public as carrying out a 
religious mission.54 The 2019 Proposed Regulation states that this can include providing 
OFCCP with an unpublished, publicly unavailable response to a private inquiry regarding 
their religious status.55 It does not require that the public—including the contractor’s own 
workers—receive actual notification of exemption from nondiscrimination requirements.56 
The proposal also specifically allows taxpayer-funded businesses to consider tenets of their 
faith when making employment and benefit decisions.57 Accordingly, organizations can 
pick and choose which tenets and standards are applied to particular individuals or groups. 
Businesses can also enforce tenets of their faith differently—even among impacted 
populations. For example, a religiously affiliated hospital could hire an openly LGBTQ 
doctor but refuse to provide spousal or transition-related health benefits based on religion.58 
In the preamble to the 2019 Proposed Regulation, the Department of Labor cites the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran as one of a series of cases in which the Court 
has “addressed the freedoms and anti-discrimination protections that must be afforded 
religion-exercising organizations and individuals under the United States Constitution and 
federal law.”59 The preamble further excuses this broad exemption by arguing that the 
exemption,  
. . . recognizes contractors’ exercise of religion, [and] is also consistent with 
Supreme Court decisions emphasizing that ‘condition[ing] the availability 
 
52 See, Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious Exemption, 
84 Fed. Reg. 41,677, 41,679, 41,682-85 (proposed on Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
(defining “religion” as a term that is not limited to religious belief but also includes all aspects of religious 
observance and practice; defining “particular religion” to clarify that the religious exemption allows 
religious contractors not only to prefer in employment individuals who share their religion, but also to 
condition employment on acceptance of or adherence to religious tenets as understood by the employing 
contractor; defining “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society” as one that: (1) 
is “organized for a religious purpose,” meaning that it was conceived with a self-identified religious 
purpose, (2) holds itself “out to the public as carrying out a religious purpose”, and (3) exercises “religion 
consistent with, and in furtherance of, a religious purpose”; defining “exercise of religion” as any sincere 
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”; defining 
“sincere” by “merely ask[ing] whether a sincerely held religious belief actually motivated the institution’s 
actions”; and proposing to apply a but-for standard of causation when evaluating claims of discrimination 
by religious organizations based on protected characteristics other than religion).  
53 See id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 41,679 (“[This proposal] is also intended to make clear that religious employers can condition 
employment on acceptance of or adherence to religious tenets without sanction by the federal government, 
provided that they do not discriminate based on other protected bases.”). 
59 Id. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 (2017) (noting that 
the government violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when it conditions a generally 
available public benefit on an entity’s giving up its religious character, unless that condition withstands the 
strictest scrutiny).” 
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of benefits upon a recipient’s willingness to surrender his religiously 
impelled status effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional 
liberties.’ Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022 (alterations omitted) (quoting 
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion)). These 
decisions naturally extend to include the right to compete on a level playing 
field for federal government contracts. See id. (government burdens 
religious exercise when it so conditions ‘‘a benefit or privilege,’’ 
‘‘eligibility for office,’’ ‘‘a gratuitous benefit,’’ or the ability ‘‘to compete 
with secular organizations for a grant’’ (quoted sources omitted)). Accord 
sec. 1, E.O. 13831 (the executive branch’s policy is to allow ‘‘faith-based 
and community organizations, to the fullest opportunity permitted by law, 
to compete on a level playing field for . . . contracts . . . and other Federal 
funding opportunities’’).60 
This is a gross misapplication of the Trinity Court’s intentionally narrow decision. The 
preamble obscures the narrow holding of the case and misleadingly suggests that it requires 
the federal government to grant broad religious exemptions to federal contractors.61 The 
2019 Proposed Regulation ignores the Court’s limiting language, which protects 
organizations from discrimination solely on the basis of religious status, rather than 
conduct. The Court includes in a now widely-cited footnote, “This case involves express 
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing. We do 
not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”62 The Department 
fails to include this footnote, which legal scholars have broadly accepted as having a 
limiting effect on the overall decision.63 
The majority opinion could not have been clearer. The enforcement of a 
nondiscrimination provision does not meet the threshold standard for burdening Free 
Exercise as described by the Trinity Lutheran Court.64 As a rule, the Establishment Clause 
does not prohibit the government from engaging in secular business with a religious 
organization; however, the Free Exercise Clause does not mandate the government fund 
religious activity or ignore religious-based actions that interfere with the operation of a 
state-funded activity.65 As a basic contractual requirement, businesses are prohibited from 
discriminating on the basis of religion, sex, or other protected characteristics included in 
 
60 Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause's Religious Exemption, 84 
Fed. Reg. at 41,680. 
61 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024-25 (finding that “[t]he exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a 
public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution 
all the same, and cannot stand,” but using narrowing language to conclude that “[t]he State has pursued its 
preferred policy to the point of expressly denying a qualified religious entity a public benefit solely because 
of its religious character. Under our precedents, that goes too far.”). 
62 Id. at 2024 (including the narrowing language as Footnote 3 to the Court’s finding that the Missouri rule 
amounts to “churches need not apply”). 
63 Special Feature: Symposium on the Court’s Ruling in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc v. 
Comer, SCOTUS BLOG (June 28, 2017), https://www.scotusblog.com/category/special-features/symposia-
on-rulings-from-october-term-2016/symposium-on-the-courts-ruling-in-trinity-lutheran-church-of-
columbia-inc-v-comer/. 
64 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024-25. 
65 Id. at 2023 (“[A] State's antiestablishment [sic] interest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training 
of clergy [is one] of few areas in which a State's antiestablishment [sic] interests come more into play.”). 
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Executive Order 11246. When a business is denied a federal contract because of 
discriminatory actions, they are not penalized because of their religious status, but because 
they fail to meet that basic contractual requirement. In sum, the federal government under 
Executive Order 11246 and its original regulations did not turn away contractors because 
of “who [they were]” but rather what they “do.”66 The Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran 
does not demand that the Department exempt contractors from compliance with Executive 
Order 11246.  
Similarly, the Trump administration proposed sweeping changes to the federal 
government’s charitable choice regulations in early 2020.67 The existing regulations were 
adopted in 2015 to revise nine Bush-era regulations designed to increase the involvement 
of faith-based organizations in operating federally funded social service programs.68 The 
existing charitable choice regulations (Existing Regulations) expanded on the basic 
beneficiary protections in the original charitable choice regulations and required faith-
based organizations to provide beneficiaries with explicit notice regarding their rights to 
 
66 Id. (distinguishing Locke in concluding that “Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; 
he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use the funds to prepare for the 
ministry”). 
67 Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in HUD Programs and Activities: Implementation of 
Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 8215; Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in USAID's 
Programs and Activities: Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2916; Equal 
Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in Veterans Affairs Programs: Implementation of Executive 
Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2938; Equal Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in Department of 
Justice's Programs and Activities: Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2921; Equal 
Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in the Department of Labor's Programs and Activities: 
Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2929; Equal Opportunity for Religious 
Organizations in U.S. Department of Agriculture Programs: Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 
Fed. Reg. 2897; Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for 
Federal Awards, Direct Grant Programs, State-Administered Formula Grant Programs, Developing 
Hispanic-Serving Institutions Program, and Strengthening Institutions Program 85 Fed. Reg. 3190; Equal 
Participation of Faith-Based Organizations in DHS's Programs and Activities: Implementation of Executive 
Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2889. 
68 The Quiet Revolution, supra note 9, at 33-34 (This highlighted that Bush-era faith-based initiative 
conducted an audit of federal regulations and policies and determined that “[w]hile some limitations on 
religious organizations within a Federal program are constitutionally required and appropriate, the audit 
found that many Federal policies and practices went well beyond constitutional and legislative 
requirements, arising from an overriding misperception by Federal officials “that close collaboration with 
religious organizations was legally suspect . . . For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s regulations for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program (which 
provides Federal funds to localities to support nongovernmental services), and for the HOME program 
(which gives funds to States and localities who often enlist community groups in efforts to provide 
affordable housing) prohibited funding “as a general rule” from going to “primarily religious” 
organizations for “any activities, including secular activities.” Under the HOME program, a “primarily 
religious” organization could establish a “wholly secular entity” that could then take part in the program. In 
the CDBG program, a further regulation provided that a “primarily religious” organization could take part, 
if it agreed to a long list of restrictions, which included forfeiting its Title VII rights (a restriction not 
required by the authorizing statute). Similarly, the Department of Education’s guidance for the Even Start 
Family Literacy Program prohibited “pervasively sectarian” organizations from receiving direct funds 
under the program and permitted such organizations to participate only as a subordinate to a “nonsectarian” 
partner organization. Even where a program’s regulations or guidance documents did not specifically 
invoke the pervasively sectarian distinction, the audit found some Federal, State, and local program staff 
applied a similar, unwritten standard resulting in the exclusion of some faith-based organizations.”). 
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be free from discrimination because of religion.69 Freedom from discrimination includes 
the rights of beneficiaries to access services regardless of their religious belief, or refusal 
to hold a religious belief or to attend or participate in religious activities.70 The Existing 
Regulations also require faith based organizations to inform beneficiaries about the process 
for filing a complaint.71 Importantly, the Existing Regulations require organizations to 
make reasonable efforts to connect a prospective beneficiary with a secular or alternative 
faith-based provider, if that beneficiary objected to the religious character of the 
organization.72  
The Existing Regulations also specifically define “direct” and “indirect” funding and 
create different levels of discrimination protections for each. Direct funding includes grant 
awards that are issued to an organization to provide a service on behalf of the government.73 
Organizations receiving direct funding are prohibited from discriminating because of: 
religion, religious belief, refusal to hold a religious belief, or a refusal to attend or 
participate in a religious practice.74 However, religious organizations receiving indirect 
funding are not required to modify their programs or activities to accommodate a 
beneficiary who may object to the religious character of their program.75 Indirect services 
are paid through a voucher, certificate, or another similar form of government-funded 
payment, this can include vouchers for child care or education, mental health services, or 
other similar programs76 Under the Existing Regulations, this carve-out for indirectly 
funded organizations was balanced by the requirement that, to be considered “indirect,” 
the individual beneficiary must have access to a secular option.77 
The Trump administration published proposals in 2020 that would remove the notice 
and referral requirements incorporated in the Existing Regulations.78 The 2020 preambles 
argue that requiring a religious organization to provide notice of rights when a secular 
organization is not required to do so is religious discrimination.79 The 2020 proposed 
 
69 Federal Agency Final Regulations Implementing Executive Order 13559: Fundamental Principles and 
Policymaking Criteria for Partnerships with Faith-Based and Other Neighborhood Organizations, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 19,355, 19,362 (Apr. 4, 2016).  
70 See, e.g., id. 
71 See, e.g., id. 
72 Id. 
73 What is the Difference Between Indirect Funding and Direct Funding?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/answers/grants-and-contracts/what-is-the-
difference-between-indirect-direct-funding/index.html (“Indirect funding is funding that an organization 
receives as the result of the genuine and independent private choice of a beneficiary through a voucher, 
certificate, coupon, or other similar mechanism. Direct funding is funding that is provided to an 
organization directly by a governmental entity or intermediate organization that has the same duties as a 
government entity.”). 
74 See supra note 68, and accompanying text. 
75 Id. 
76 Fundamental Principles and Policymaking Criteria for Partnerships with Faith-Based and Other 
Neighborhood Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. at 19,426. 
77 Id. 
78 Numerous agencies, including the Justice Department, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Housing 
and Urban Development, issued regulations to promote religious exemptions in accordance with the White 
House Faith and Opportunity Initiative, Executive Order 13831. Executive Order 13831, 85 FR 2921 
(DOJ), 85 FR 2974 (HHS), 85 FR 2929 (Labor), 85 FR 8215 (HUD), 85 FR 2938 (Veterans Affairs), 85 
FR 2889 (DHS), 85 FR 2897 (USDA), 85 FR 3190 (Education), 85 FR 2916 (USAID).  
79 Id.   
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charitable choice regulations (2020 Proposed Regulations) would remove the existence of 
a secular option requirement for funding to be considered “indirect.” However, the 2020 
Proposed Regulations retain the lower nondiscrimination standard that relieves these 
organizations from the obligation to modify or accommodate a beneficiary that objects to 
the religious character of their organization.80 The 2020 Proposed Regulations would also 
add language stating the program “may require attendance at all activities that are 
fundamental to the program,” including religious activities.81 In practice, this will mean 
that a beneficiary may be presented with only religiously-based service options in order to 
use their voucher and may then be compelled to engage in religious practices or activities 
by the organization. 
The 2020 Proposed Regulations also assert that the existing requirement of a referral 
to a secular organization is an undue burden.82 In support of removing the referral 
requirement, the regulation cites directly to Trinity Lutheran.83 The use of Trinity Lutheran 
to sanction religiously-based discriminatory actions is a similarly unfaithful application of 
the standard set by the Court. Under the 2020 Proposed Regulations, federal agencies must 
not only evaluate grant requests from faith-based organizations alongside secular 
organizations (regardless of the organization’s religious status), but also hold these 
organizations to a different and lesser standard regarding service delivery. The latter 
mandate directly conflicts with the language of the Trinity Lutheran majority opinion. 
II. UNDERSTANDING NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS AND REQUEST FOR RELIGIOUS-
BASED EXEMPTIONS 
A. RFRA and Hobby Lobby v. Burwell 
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in the 
wake of the Supreme Court decision Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.84 In this case, Justice Scalia held that the Free Exercise 
Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws to ceremonial ingestion of 
peyote.85 Therefore, the State could deny claimants’ unemployment compensation for 
work-related misconduct based on use of the drug without violating the Constitution.86 
The Smith decision ignited a swift response from diverse civil rights, religious, and 
service groups including the ACLU, the Baptist Joint Committee, the Anti-Defamation 
League, and the Human Rights Campaign. RFRA was designed to safeguard the rights of 
vulnerable religious minorities like those targeted in Smith. RFRA prohibits the federal 
government from “substantially burden[ing]” a person’s free exercise of religion unless it 
is the least restrictive means by which to achieve a compelling government interest.87 The 






84 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 890. 
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1. 
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claims. Over the past two decades, however, organizations and businesses seeking 
exemptions from laws of general applicability weaponized RFRA.88 
 Although courts have not interpreted RFRA to exempt individuals from compliance 
with these laws, Hobby Lobby89 provided an unprecedented re-interpretation of the statute 
in 2014. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that the Department of Health and 
Human Service’s enforcement of the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate 
violated RFRA.90 The Hobby Lobby Court held that requiring employers to cover access 
to contraception on a group health insurance plan not only burdened the sincerely held 
religious beliefs of the business, but was also not the least restrictive means to ensure 
contraceptive coverage for workers.91 The Court also determined that the term “person” 
under RFRA includes for-profit businesses.92  
Although the impact of this decision on access to contraception and reproductive care 
is inarguably profound, the RFRA analysis as written and employed by the Court is not 
directly transferable to analyzing the constitutionality of nondiscrimination provisions. The 
Court’s reliance on the “least restrictive means” prong isolates the decision’s usefulness in 
other contexts. In Hobby Lobby, the Court determined that alternative, less restrictive 
governmental actions were available to further the compelling interest of providing 
healthcare.93 Nondiscrimination provisions are the least restrictive means to ending 
discrimination, which is a well-established compelling interest.94 The government cannot 
end discrimination if it allows discrimination to occur, or if some parties are exempt from 
complying with generally applicable laws. Justice Alito limited the reach of this decision 
to the specific facts at hand, dismissing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which raised the 
concern that the decision could be used to excuse discrimination in hiring that is “cloaked 
as religious practice to escape legal sanction.”95 Justice Alito concluded that “[the Court’s] 
decision . . . provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in 
providing equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and 
prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”96  
 
88 See, e.g., EEOC v. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 591 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that the 
respondent’s construction of the compelling self-interest test, wherein the EEOC complained that 
terminating an employee because of her proposed gender nonconforming behavior and the funeral home 
instead focused on its defense that it merely wished to enforce an appropriate workplace uniform, was off-
base). 
89 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
90 Id. at 683. 
91 Id. at 685, 686. 
92 Id. at 684. 
93 Id. 
94 Robin S. Maril & Sarah Warbelow, Finding an End to Federally Sanctioned Discrimination: A Call to 
Rescind the 2007 OLC World Vision Memo, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 445, 463 (2016) (“The 
government has a longstanding and well-established interest in eradicating invidious discrimination. 
Evidence of this interest has been bolstered over the past decade by recent federal marriage equality 
decisions both at the Supreme Court and multiple federal district and circuit level courts. The adoption of 
state-level nondiscrimination laws across the nation in states traditionally reticent to extend protections to 
LGBT people, including Utah and Nevada, illustrate not only the growing acceptance of LGBT people, but 
a shared belief in the government’s role to prohibit discrimination against individuals on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity by private businesses and landlords.”). 
95 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) 
96 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 733 (2014). 
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 Lower courts have directly ruled on the application of RFRA as a means to gain 
exemption from civil rights provisions. The Sixth Circuit held in EEOC v. Harris Funeral 
Homes97 that RFRA could not be used as a defense to otherwise unlawful discrimination.98 
In this case, after successfully working at a Michigan funeral home for nearly six years, 
Aimee Stephens informed her employer that she would be undergoing a gender transition, 
and would begin wearing the women’s uniform to work.99 She was fired within days.100 
The funeral home argued that Title VII should not apply to their business, because requiring 
the funeral home to continue to employ Stephens while she presented as a woman would 
constitute an unjustified substantial burden on the owner’s sincerely held religious belief 
under RFRA.101 The Sixth Circuit disagreed.102 It found that to counter a claim under 
RFRA, the government need only prove that the action in question is the least restrictive 
means for accomplishing a compelling government interest.103 The Sixth Circuit cited two 
lower federal courts holding that Title VII serves as the least restrictive means for ending 
employment discrimination—a well-established compelling government interest.104 The 
Court further relied on the decisions of state courts that held that nondiscrimination 
provisions not only survive strict scrutiny, but also allow for fewer religious based 
exemptions than other generally applicable laws.105 
The Sixth Circuit also held that requiring an employer to recognize a worker’s gender 
identity did not substantially burden the employer’s rights under RFRA.106 Specifically, 
the Court held that, “as a matter of law, tolerating Stephens’s understanding of her sex and 
gender identity is not tantamount to supporting it. . . . simply permitting Stephens to wear 
attire that reflects a conception of gender that is at odds with Rost’s religious beliefs is not 
a substantial burden under RFRA.”107  The Court distinguished “tolerating” Stephens’s 
gender identity from “supporting” it and noted that eight other circuits have confirmed this 
approach to applying RFRA.108  
B. Systematic Manipulation of RFRA and Hobby Lobby 
 Immediately upon taking office, the Trump administration began implementing a 
systematic rescission and redesign of civil rights and programmatic regulations based on a 
distorted manipulation of RFRA and interpretation of case law. These government-wide 
efforts were centralized through the Department of Justice. Under former Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions, DOJ published a memorandum implementing sweeping directives across 
 
97 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018). 
98 Id. at 567. 
99 Id. at 568. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 567. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 583.  
104 Id. at 595 (“We also find meaningful Congress's decision not to include exemptions within Title VII to 
the prohibition on sex-based discrimination. As both the Supreme Court and other circuits have recognized, 
‘“[t]he very existence of a government-sanctioned exception to a regulatory scheme that is purported to be 
the least restrictive means can, in fact, demonstrate that other, less-restrictive alternatives could exist.’”). 
105 Id. at 596. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 588. 
108 See id.; see also Mich. Catholic Conf. & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 
2015),  vacated sub nom. Mich. Catholic Conf. v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016). 
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federal agencies regarding religious exemptions and the interpretation of RFRA to evaluate 
existing regulations for potential intersections with religious rights. This guidance also 
urged Departments to engage in rulemaking to amend any policies to explicitly allow 
religious organizations and individuals to discriminate.109 As a result of this memo, 
agencies as disparate as the Departments of Housing and Urban Development,110 
Agriculture,111 and Labor112 engaged in misguided and unnecessary rulemaking, citing 
RFRA and the Hobby Lobby opinion as mandates for reforms.  
 On November 19, 2019, Health and Human Services (HHS) published a proposed 
rule revising the regulations adopting the federal Uniform Administrative Requirements 
for grant programs.113 The Trump administration proposed a revision to this regulation that 
stripped the explicit nondiscrimination provision, as well as a provision referencing the 
decisions in U.S. v. Windsor114 and Obergefell v. Hodges115—the Supreme Court cases 
recognizing federal marriage equality.116  
 Originally adopted in December 2016, the regulations implementing the Uniform 
Administrative Requirements for grant programs prohibited discrimination in all HHS 
grant programs.117 The preamble indicated that HHS designed the nondiscrimination 
provision to align grant programs with the beneficiary protections in the HHS acquisition 
regulations found at 45 C.F.R. 352.237–74.118 The 2016 regulation specifically prohibited 
discrimination by HHS grantees on the basis of age, disability, sex, race, color, national 
origin, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation.119 
 The 2016 HHS grant regulation provided essential security for individuals served 
by HHS-funded programs that did not have an independent regulatory or statutory 
nondiscrimination provision. In the absence of this protection, LGBTQ people, women, 
and religious minorities will face an increased risk of discrimination or denial of taxpayer-
funded services without recourse, including foster care and adoption programs, Head Start, 
 
109 Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General Sessions Issues 
Guidance on 
Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty (Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with Department of Justice), https://w
ww.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-issues-guidance-federal-law-protections-religious-liberty 
(implementing a sweeping directive to federal agencies regarding religious exemptions in part utilizing an 
overly broad interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
110 Making Admission or Placement Determinations Based on Sex in Facilities Under Community Planning 
and Development Housing Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,811 (proposed July 24, 2020) (to be codified 24 
C.F.R. pt. 5). 
111 Equal Opportunity for Religious Organizations in U.S. Department of Agriculture Programs: 
Implementation of Executive Order 13831, 85 Fed. Reg. 2,897 (proposed Jan. 17, 2020) (to be codified 7 
C.F.R. pt. 16). 
112 Guidance Regarding Federal Grants and Executive Order 13798, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.d
ol.gov/agencies/oasam/grants/religious-freedom-restoration-act. 
113 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources; Health and Human Services Grants 
Regulation, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,831 (proposed November 19, 2019) (to be codified 45 C.F.R. pt. 75). 
114 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
115 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
116 See generally, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources; Health and Human Services 
Grants Regulation, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,831. 
117 Health and Human Services Grants Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,393 (proposed Dec. 12, 2016) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 75).  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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senior supportive services, maternal health programs, and substance abuse recovery 
programs.120 
 In the notice of proposed rulemaking, HHS expressed concerns that the existing 
2016 regulation was unconstitutional and violated RFRA.121 However, in the recent case 
of Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit rejected a claim for exemptions under 
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act, which is analogous to the relevant 
provisions of this regulation.122 In Fulton, a religiously affiliated foster care agency 
challenged the enforcement of a city-wide requirement that foster care agencies not 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.123 The agency argued that its religious 
convictions prevented it from certifying same-sex married couples as foster parents.124 The 
court found it “unlikely” that the nondiscrimination requirement imposed a “substantial 
burden” on the agency under Pennsylvania law.125 “[E]ven if” there were a substantial 
burden, however, the court held that the agency was “not likely to prevail on its RFRA 
claim because the City’s actions are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
government interest.”126 As the court explained, “[i]t is black-letter law that ‘eradicating 
discrimination’ is a compelling interest.”127 Therefore, “the mere existence of [plaintiff’s] 
discriminatory policy is enough to offend the City’s compelling interest in anti-
discrimination.”128  
 The 2016 HHS nondiscrimination rule targets the same forms of invidious 
discrimination at issue in Fulton. As the Third Circuit determined in Fulton, the rule as 
currently written advances a “compelling governmental interest” in prohibiting 
discrimination.129 Further, the Third Circuit held that prohibiting such discrimination is the 
least restrictive means sufficient to further this interest.130 The Trump administration’s 
elimination of the enumerated protections within this regulation grants a blanket license to 
entities receiving federal funds to discriminate without regard to the facts of any particular 
case. Indeed, grantees could discriminate against LGBTQ individuals even if the 
motivation for such discrimination were not religious at all. 
III. THESE REGULATIONS ARE NOT LEGALLY SUPPORTED AND VIOLATE THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. 
The Trump administration’s persistent reliance on a novel and judicially contradicted 
interpretation of RFRA to support expansive regulatory changes is a thinly veiled attempt 
 
120 Human Rights Campaign public comment in response to Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial 
Resources; Health and Human Services Grants Regulation, 84 Fed. Reg. 63831. 
121 Health and Human Services Grants Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,393. 
122 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (mem.). 
123 922 F.3d at 146. 
124 Id. at 148. 
125 Id. at 163. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). “And mandating compliance is the least 
restrictive means of pursuing that interest.” Id. 
128 Id. at 164. 
129 Id. 
130 Cf. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 733 (noting that “prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely 
tailored to achieve” the Government’s “compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate 
in the workforce without regard to race”). 
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to mislead the general public and to gaslight administrative lawyers, advocates, and 
regulated entities. In each of the administrative actions taken under the guise of RFRA and 
Trinity Lutheran, the federal government has failed to provide grantees, beneficiaries, and 
the public with the legally required justification for these far-reaching changes. In all the 
proposed regulations discussed above, the government provides mere sentences to explain 
revisions that will impact millions of people. Although courts traditionally defer to the 
agencies when interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Trump 
administration’s reliance on an interpretation of RFRA that contradicts federal court 
decisions interpreting the statute forfeits this nearly automatic deference. 
This seemingly purposeful misinterpretation violates Section 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that an agency action is unlawful if it is 
found to be, “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”131 In Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,132 the Supreme Court provided that 
to meet this standard, “an agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions. The agency 
‘must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”133 The 
Court has also made clear that the “arbitrary and capricious” review includes a review of 
the authority and legal reasoning employed by the agency.134  
The Supreme Court has held that an agency action that conflicts with a previous 
judicial interpretation of an unambiguous statute violates the APA regardless of the level 
of deference to which the action is originally entitled.135 However, the Court has held that 
an agency can dismiss judicial precedent and demand deference when the statute in 
question is ambiguous or where Congress has provided room for agency discretion.136 An 
agency is entitled to choose among different interpretations of the statute. However, here, 
there is no alternative interpretation of RFRA by the courts. 
The Sixth Circuit decision in EEOC v. Harris Funeral Home137 and the Third Circuit 
decision in Fulton v. Philadelphia138 provide clear, consistent precedent that the executive 
branch should follow—enforcement of generally applicable nondiscrimination provisions 
does not violate RFRA and the statute does not mandate exemptions from compliance.139 
Further, the statute as it pertains to exemptions and enforcement of such provisions is not 
ambiguous. The unambiguous nature of the statute paired with this cross-circuit agreement 
leaves no interpretative “gaps” for the administration to fill by regulation. The 
administration’s application of RFRA as a mandate for reversing nondiscrimination 
 
131 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2020). 
132 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016). 
133 Id. at 2125 (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assn. of United States v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
134 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (“Section 706(2)(A) requires 
a finding that the actual choice made was not ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1964 ed., Supp. V)). 
135 Maislin Indus., Inc., v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990) (“Once we have determined a 
statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an 
agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning.”). 
136 See Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
137 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018). 
138 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019). 
139 See supra Part II. 
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provisions and granting broad exemptions to religious employers and organizations 
conflicts with judicial precedent.  
The administration’s application of Trinity Lutheran is similarly misleading. 
Although the Court in Trinity Lutheran held in favor of Trinity Lutheran Church under the 
Free Exercise Clause, it also acknowledged that its decision was far from a mandate.140 
Further, it concretely established the distinction between discrimination on the basis of 
mere status and government decisions based on an organization’s actions or conduct.141 
The Trinity Lutheran decision clearly provides religious organizations and churches with 
a “level playing field,” with access to federal grants and programs, initially codified by the 
Bush-era faith-based regulations. The Justices, however, included explicit limiting 
language that their decision does not engage with state decisions in response to religious 
conduct. It is far from the mandate that the Trump administration has claimed.142 
The Trump administration’s re-interpretation of RFRA, Hobby Lobby, and Trinity 
Lutheran to mandate religious exemptions is unlawful and interferes with the “province 
and duty” of Congress to design statutes and of the judiciary to interpret them.143 Therefore, 
the Trump administration’s reliance on a misinterpretation of legal authority as “data” is 
“arbitrary and capricious” and a clear violation of the APA.  
CONCLUSION 
Since taking office in January 2017, the Trump administration has engaged in an 
aggressive, unconstitutional, and legally specious campaign to systematically rescind 
administrative civil rights protections and import broad religious exemptions across the 
federal register. Citing a troubling combination of recent and foundational cases, the 
administration has coordinated a near-acrobatic legal analysis across federal rulemaking 
that has ushered in an unprecedented disregard for the constitutional rights of beneficiaries 
of federal programs. The administration’s manipulation of Supreme Court decisions as 
mandates for these reforms is a direct violation of the APA, calling into question their 





140 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 2029 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
143 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
